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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA 
J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ESTATE OF DANIEL H. MEYER, 
ELDON J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, 
JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, 
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, 
WILMA WHITE, OTIS DIBLER, 
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE DAVIS, 
and MARLOWE C. SMITH, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
AUDREY DEFENDANTS 
CASE NO. 16032 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff-appellant Rio 
Algom Corporation (hereinafter "Rio") seeking a declaratory 
ruling as to the proper basis for computing and disbursing 
royalties payable by Rio to defendant-respondents pursuant to 
certain written lease agreements and relating to certain 
unpatented lode mining claims in San Juan County, Utah 
(hereinafter sometimes "subject properties"). 
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The Jimco Defendants1 counterclaimed against Rio and 
cross-claimed against the Audrey Defendants 2 alleging inter 
alia mutual mistake of fact, breach of implied covenant and 
condition, material misrepresentation (fraud) and negligence, 
and seeking reformation, rescission and/or damages. 
The Audrey Defendants cross-claimed against the Jimco 
Defendants and counterclaimed against Rio alleging breach of 
contract and seeking payment of royalties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This appeal is taken by Rio from an Order dated 
August 29, 1978 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B") by which the Honorable Dean E. Conder, District Judge, 
Third Judicial District Court (1) granted leave to Rio to file 
its Amended Complaint; (2) ruled that Rio has no standing under 
either of the aforementioned leases, or any other theory of law 
or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation and 
implementation of a Settlement Stipulation dated July 10, 1978 
1 Those defendant-respondents comprised of the 
following named parties: JIMCO LTD., Humeca Exploration 
Company, Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer as the Executrix of 
the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson, 
Juanita J. Meyer and Jean L. Card. 
2 Those defendant-respondents comprised of the 
following named parties: Audrey White, N.J. White, Wilma 
White, Otis Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis and Marlowe 
C. Smith. 
-2-
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(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") between the 
Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants, and that said 
Settlement Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed to 
Rio by any of the defendants; (3) dismissed with prejudice all 
claims by Rio against the Audrey Defendants, all claims by the 
Audrey Defendants against Rio, all claims by the Audrey 
Defendants against the Jimco Defendants, and all claims by the 
Jimco Defendants against the Audrey Defendants; and (4) ordered 
disbursement to the Audrey Defendants, both retroactively and 
prospectively, of that portion of the royalties to which the 
Audrey Defendants were and are to become entitled under the 
terms of the Audrey Lease and the Settlement Stipulation. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Audrey Defendants seek to have the Order of Judge 
Conder upholding the Settlement Stipulation affirmed; whereas 
Rio seeks to have the Settlement Stipulation and the order 
upholding it declared null and void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
A. Description of the Parties. 
1. Plaintiff-Appellant Rio. Rio is a 
corporation organized pursuant to the laws of the State of 
3. Rio's statement of facts contained within its 
brief is erroneous, incomplete and argumentative in certain 
respects. Since the factual context in which the appeal must 
be considered is complex the Audrey Defendants submit that a 
full factual statement must be made even though it will be 
somewhat repetitive of Rio's statement. 
-3-
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Delaware, qualified to do business in the State of Utah and 
engaged in the business of mining and beneficiating uranium ore 
from the Lisbon Mine located in San Juan County, Utah. Rio is 
the wholly owned subsidiary of Altas Alloys, Inc., which is in 
turn is wholly owned by Rio Algom Ltd., a Canadian corporation, 
engaged internationally in the uranium trade. 
2. Respondent Jimco Defendants. JIMCO, LTD. is 
a limited partnership with more than 100 limited partners which 
is organized pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake City. Humeca 
Exploration Corporation is a partnership organized pursuant to 
the laws of the State of Utah. Jim L. Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer 
and Eldon J. Card are the general partners of JIMCO LTD., and 
are all partners of Humeca. Norma Hudson and Jean L. Card are 
the wives of Jim L. Hudson and Eldon J. Card. Juanita J. Meyer 
is the Executrix of the Estate of Daniel H. Meyer, deceased. 
3. Respondent Audrey Defendants. All of the 
Audrey Defendants are individuals who participated in the 
original discovery of these uranium properties and who own 
undivided interests in the subject mineral properties. Three 
of the group, i.e., Audrey White, Grace Davis and Adrian Smith 
are elderly widows and substantially dependent upon the income 
from such properties. Marlowe Smith died after the 
commencement of this action and is survived by his wife Adrian. 
-4-
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B. Contractual Relationships Between the Parties. By 
agreement executed on or about July 12, 1968, but back-dated to 
June 1, 1968 (a copy of which is attached to the Complaint as 
Exhibit "C" at T.R. pp. 74-125 and is hereafter referred to as 
the "Audrey Lease") the Audrey Defendants together with Rio 
leased to the Jimco Defendants certain unpatented lode mining 
claims in San Juan County, Utah (the subject properties). The 
Audrey Defendants and Rio are collectively referred to as 
"Lessors" in the Audrey Lease and share undivided ownership in 
such properties in a 3 to 1 ratio, i.e., the Audrey Defendants 
collectively own a 3/4 undivided interest and Rio owns a 1/4 
undivided interest. The lease was granted for the stated 
purpose of "exploration, development, mining and exploitation" 
of the subject properties. T.R. p. 75. 
This Audrey Lease amended and otherwise superseded a 
prior lease dated February 28, 1964 (denominated herein the 
"Original" or "Head" Lease) of the same uranium properties 
between the Audrey Defendants, or their predecessors in 
interest, and the Jimco Defendants' predecessors in interest. 
During the interim period between the execution of the Original 
Lease and the Audrey Lease, Rio acquired its one-fourth (1/4) 
undivided interest in the ownership of the subject properties. 
By agreement dated June 3, 1968 (a copy of which is 
attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "A" at T.R. pp. 7-72 and 
hereinafter referred to as the "Jimco Agreement") the Jimco 
-5-
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Defendants granted to Rio an option to acquire the Jimco 
Defendants' rights and obligations under the Audrey Lease. 
This option was exercised by Rio on or about June 18, 1968, 
thereby making Rio the lessee of the subject properties as well 
as a one-fourth undivided interest owner thereof. 
As previously noted, the Audrey Lease was executed 
subsequent to the exercise of the option by Rio and back-dated 
to June 1, two days prior to the execution of the Jimco 
Agreement. This back-dating was acknowledged and explained in 
paragraph 2.3 of the Audrey Lease: 
"The parties hereto recognize and acknowledge that Rio 
Algom Corporation, in a capacity distinct from its capacity 
as one of the Lessors herein, on June 18, 1968 held a valid 
and subsisting option [the Jimco Agreement) to acquire 
assignment of the leasehold interest of Lessee in the 
Original Lease [the Jimco Defendants or their predecessors 
in interest] and the mining claims covered thereby, subject 
to the terms and conditions of the Option Agreement. Rio 
Algom Corporation duly exercised the option as of June 18, 
1968. This lease has been predated to June 1, 1968, for 
the explicit purpose of avoiding confusion in the record 
title. The parties hereto recognize the validity of the 
exercise of said option by Rio Algom Corporation and affirm 
the binding nature of this amended lease." 
T.R. pp. 78, 79. 
While the Audrey Defendants were aware of the Jimco 
Agreement and its exercise by Rio, the Audrey Defendants were 
not parties thereto. 
Following the execution of both the Audrey Lease and 
the Jimco Agreement, Rio entered upon the subject properties 
and commenced the mining and milling of uranium ore. Rio also 
-6-
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contracted with Duke Power Company for the sale to Duke of the 
beneficiated product u3o8 , also referred to as "uranium 
concentrate" and "yellowcake." 
C. Royalty Rights and Obligations of the Parties. 
1. Audrey Lease (Audrey Defendants-Rio-Jimco 
Defendants). Under the terms of paragraph 3.1 of the Audrey 
Lease, the Lessors (including both the Audrey Defendants and 
Rio) are to receive "Earned Royalties" dependent upon whether 
crude ore or mineral concentrate is sold by the Lessee: 
"(a) In the event Lessee shall mine or extract ore 
from the Audrey Group [leased properties] which is sold in 
its raw or crude form Lessee shall pay Lessors a royalty 
equal to eight percent (8%) of the "Sales Price" ••• received 
by Lessee from the sale of all ores mined, produced and 
sold in the crude form from the Audrey Group ••• " (Emphasis 
added) • 
T.R. p. 80. 
"(b) In the event Lessee shall mine or extract ore 
from the Audrey Group and recover therefrom for sale or use 
in commercial quantities any of the minerals contained in 
such ore, and if the minerals so recovered shall be any 
uranium compound, Lessee shall pay to Lessors a royalty of 
four percent (4%) of the "Gross Value" of such 
compounds •.• " (Emphasis added) • 
T.R. pp. 80, 81. 
"(c) If Lessee shall recover for sale or use in 
commercial quantities, any minerals contained in the ores 
mined and produced from the Audrey Group, and if such 
minerals so recovered shall be compounds or elements other 
than uranium compounds, or elements Lessees shall pay to 
Lessors a royalty of four percent (4%) of the market value 
thereof ... " (Emphasis added). 
T.R. p. 83. 
-7-
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Paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease provides an 
alternative basis for the computation of royalties which allows 
the Lessors to elect to have royalties computed on the basis of 
the fair market value of crude ore even though uranium 
concentrate (U 30 8 ) was milled and sold by Lessee: 
"3.2 Irrespective of the provisions set forth in 
paragraph 3.1 above, Lessors shall have the election and 
option to have royalties due them under the terms of this 
Lease calculated and paid upon the basis of eight percent 
(8%) of the fair market value at the mine portal of crude 
ore mined and produced from the Audrey Group ••. " (Emphasis 
added) • 
T.R. p. 83. 
Paragraph 3.2 goes on to state how this election may 
be exercised and revoked: 
" ••. In order to exercise such election Lessors must 
unanimously agree and notify Lessee in writing at least 
ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of any calendar 
year of their election to require royalties to be 
calculated and paid in such manner. After having given 
such notice, the election so made shall remain in force and 
effect for the next ensuing calendar year, and from year to 
year thereafter, unless the Lessors should unanimously 
agree to notify Lessee in writing of their revocation of 
said election, which notification must be given at least 
ninety (90) days prior to the commencement of a calendar 
year and shall become effective at the commencement of, and 
remain in effect during the ensuing calendar year, and from 
year to year thereafter, unless another such notification 
of election is given at the time and in the manner as 
specified above." (Emphasis added). 
T • R • pp. 8 3 , 8 4 . 
At this point it should be noted that Rio's 
acknowledged dual capacity i.e., one-fourth (l/4) undivided 
interest owner of the subject properties and therefore entitled 
-8-
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to one-fourth of the Earned Royalties under the Audrey Lease, 
and assignee of Lessee with the obligation to pay all such 
Earned Royalties, places Rio in a conflict of interest with 
respect to the computation of royalties and particularly with 
respect to the election under paragraph 3.2. Stated simply, 
for every $4.00 in royalties paid by Rio as Lessee-operator, 
Rio would get $1.00 back as co-Lessor with the other $3.00 
going to the co-Lessor Audrey Defendants, thereby resulting in 
a net negative $3.00 to Rio. Consequently, under the royalty 
provisions of the Audrey Lease, the greater the amount of 
royalties paid by Rio as the Lessee-operator of the properties 
the more advantageous to the Audrey Defendants and the more 
costly to Rio. 
Recognizing this adversity in position with respect to 
the election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, the 
following exclusion was written into paragraph 21.3: 
"21.3 Rio Algom Corporation shall by reason of its 
interest in this Lease as described in Section II hereof 
[see discussion supra] be excluded from any vote or 
decision of the Lessors relating to royalties and requiring 
unanimity of the Lessors, as provided for in Section 3.2 
hereof. The unanimous vote or decision of the remaining 
Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation shall constitute 
unanimity for the purpose of the said Section 3.2." 
(Emphasis added) • 
T.R. p. ll8. 
2. Jimco Agreement -- (Jimco Defendants-Rio). 
Under paragraph X of the Jimco Agreement, if uranium 
concentrate (u 3o8) is sold Rio as sub-Lessee is to pay 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Earned Royalties" to royalty interest holders (including the 
Audrey Defendants, Rio and the Jimco Defendants) according to a 
schedule of from 8% to a maximum of 15% of the average price 
per pound of u3o8 • If the product derived and sold by Rio 
is crude uranium ore, the Earned Royalty rate is fourteen 
percent (14%). If the product derived and sold by Rio is ore 
other than uranium ores, wastes or tailings, the Earned Royalty 
rate is ten percent (10%). T.R. p. 35. 
With respect to the division or distribution of Earned 
Royalties once the dollar amount thereof has been calculated, 
Rio is to make payments according to the following priorities: 
" (i) first, to satisfy the royalty to the Lessors 
in the Head Lease [Audrey Lease] .•• in its entirety ... 
(ii) second, if a balance of Earned 
Royalty .•. remains after payment of Lessors' royalties ..• to 
pay in their entirety the Overriding Royalties ..• 
(iii) third, if a balance of Earned 
Royalty .•• remains after payment of the Lessors' royalties 
and Overriding Royalties ..• to pay such balance to JIMCO." 
(Emphasis added). 
T.R. pp. 45, 46. 
By paragraph XII of the Jimco Agreement a ceiling or 
maximum is placed upon the aggregate amount of royalties 
payable by Rio: 
"Notwithstanding anything else herein: 
(a) Rio's maximum aggregate cost or liability from 
time to time to all persons ... shall be: 
(1) Advance Royalties ... 
( 2) Sustaining Royalties ... 
-10-
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(Emphasis 
(3) the royalties payable to the Lessors 
pursuant to the Head Lease [Audrey Lease] ... 
(5) the balance, if any, of Earned Royalties 
calculated under Clause X hereof after 
apportionment and payment therefrom of 
royalties to the Lessors of the Head 
Lease •.• [to the Jimco Defendants]." 
added). 
T • R • PP • 4 4 I 4 5 • 
It should be noted that it is the Audrey Defendants' 
contention below that the setting of a maximum or ceiling of 
the sale price of (u 3o8 ) upon Rio's Earned Royalty 
obligation, coupled with the aforestated payment priorities, 
theoretically at least creates the possibility that the Jimco 
Defendants can be entirely closed out of the royalty picture. 
In other words, if the Earned Royalties to which the Audrey 
Defendants and Rio as Lessors under the Audrey Lease (the 
obligation for which was delegated to Rio under the Jimco 
Agreement) equals or exceeds the 15% maximum under the Jimco 
Agreement the "if any" language would eliminate any additional 
obligation by Rio to pay the Jimco Defendants. Also, because 
of this maximum, under certain circumstances the greater the 
Earned Royalty to the Ardrey Defendants, the less the payment 
to the Jimco Defendants. 
D. Events Giving Rise to This Lawsuit. Pursuant to 
the provisions of these agreements Rio took possession of the 
subject properties and commenced mining uranium ores, 
beneficiating such ores into uranium concentrate (U 308 ) and 
selling the concentrate to Duke Power Company. In August of 
-11-
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1975, the Audrey Defendants (and to the exclusion of Rio) 
exercised their election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey 
Lease and served notice upon Rio that beginning January 1, 1976 
they wished to have the Earned Royalties under the Audrey Lease 
calculated and paid upon the basis of 8% of the external fair 
market value of crude ore rather than on the basis of 4% of 
sale price of u3o8 from the subject properties. In 
reaction to this notification, the Jimco Defendants asserted to 
Rio that the "fair market value" of crude ore within the 
meaning of paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease must refer to the 
internal market value of crude ore which is a function of the 
price actually being paid to Rio by Duke Power Company for the 
sale of u3o8 from the subject properties. 
By reason of this conflict as to the proper basis upon 
which to calculate Earned Royalties under the election Rio 
filed this action on April 27, 1976 seeking a declaratory 
determination of the proper basis for calculation and alleging 
that it was unable, without judicial clarification, to 
calculate its royalty obligations under the Audrey Lease and 
Jimco Agreement. T.R. pp. 1-6. Asserting that the action is in 
the "nature of an interpleader" (T.R. pp. 801-803, 1392-1398; 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to the Audrey Defandants 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a 
-12-
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Preliminary Injunction" 4 pp. 1-7), and that it is a 
"stakeholder" (Id.), Rio commenced tendering the Earned 
Royalties into Court until the question of computation under 
the Audrey Lease and distribution under the Jimco Agreement 
could be determined. 
By way of Cross-Claim and Counterclaim the Audrey 
Defendants alleged failure on the part of both the Jimco 
Defendants and Rio to pay the Earned Royalties pursuant to the 
terms of the Audrey Lease, and prayed for payment of the sums 
due plus interest and a 25% penalty pursuant to paragraph 
14.l(b) of the Audrey Lease. T.R. pp. 333-336. By way of 
Cross-Claim and Counterclaim the Jimco Defendants alleged inter 
alia mutual mistake of material fact, breach of implied 
covenant and condition, material misrepresentation (fraud) and 
negligence and prayed for reformation, rescission and/or 
damages. 
From the date of the commencement of this action until 
July 10, 1978 (the date of execution of the Settlement 
Stipulation) the parties carried on extensive discovery both in 
4. Pages 1-7 of Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response 
to the Audrey Defendants Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was prperly and 
timely designated by counsel for Audrey Defendants, see T.R. 
2113 item #23, but was not included in the record or appeal. 
Counsel for Audrey Defendants has requested that the record on 
appeal be supplemented to include the designated portions of 
this document. 
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the u.s. and Canada. Already complex issues became even more 
complex as allegations of international uranium cartels and 
conspiracies permeated discussions of the "fair market value" 
issue. 
Deposits into Court during this period (13 in number) 
totaled some $1.3 million. T.R. p. 1985. 
E. Settlement Stipulation. On July 10, 1978, and 
following considerable negotiation, the Audrey Defendants and 
the Jimco Defendants entered into a Settlement Stiuplation 
(T.R. pp. 2241-2244) "[i]n an effort to resolve this dispute, 
and in furtherance of the public policy to settle litigation 
when possible." (T.R. pp. 2241, 2242). Without admission or 
determination of the issues surrounding the "fair market value" 
question, the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants agreed 
as to how the royalties to which they were entitled would be 
distributed as between themselves. In other words they settled 
the dispute which had spawned the lawsuit in the first place. 
Simply stated, the Audrey Defendants agreed to take in full 
satisfaction of all their royalty claims their 3% of the sale 
price of u3o8 (after reduction by Rio's l%), together with 
an assignment of an additional 2.5% of such sale price from the 
Jimco Defendants royalty share also based upon u3o8 sales 
price. This agreed upon division of royalties was to apply 
retroactively to those funds on deposit with the Court as well 
as prospectively for the remainder of the Audrey Lease period. 
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For the calendar year 1979, and all years thereafter, the 
Audrey Defendants waived their sole right and discretion to 
elect under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease to have royalties 
based upon 8% of the market value of crude ore. Lastly, the 
Audrey Defendants dismissed all their claims against the Jimco 
Defendants and Rio, and the Jimco Defendants dismissed all 
their claims against the Audrey Defendants. 
Because of the knowledge that Rio objected to the 
settlement, it was expressly made subject to the following 
condition precedent: 
"The foregoing stipulation is subject only to the 
condition precedent of the Court's ruling, pursuant to the 
motion made herein, that Rio has no right based upon either 
the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or based upon any 
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise 
bar the effectuation or implementation of this settlement 
stipulation, that such settlement is not in violation of 
any duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants, and that the 
effectuation and implementation of this settlement 
stipulation effectively and totally dismisses the Audrey 
Defendants from this litigation, and that those funds 
presently on deposit with the court equal to 5.5% of the 
proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 
1, 1976, together with accrued interest thereon, less any 
amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants 
therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants." 
The filing of the Settlement Stipulation was 
accompanied by a motion of similar language seeking the 
prerequisite court ruling. At the request of Rio the matter 
was set for oral argument. 
The matter was fully briefed and argued orally to the 
trial Court by all parties with Rio raising precisely the same 
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points now raised on appeal, i.e., amendment of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty and breach of implied covenant. 
In addition to resisting the motion Rio sought to 
amend its complaint to add additional claims relating to and 
allegedly arising out of the Settlement Stipulation and 
claiming violation of fiduciary duties, violation of co-tenant 
fiduciary duties, and interference with contractual and 
co-tenancy relationship, and seeking imposition of a 
constructive trust and damages. T.R. pp. 2099-2110. 
Following oral argument on August 16, 1978, the Court, 
per Judge Conder who had been permanently assigned to the case, 
entered a written order dated August 29, 1978 (T.R. pp. 
1982-1985), which granted Rio leave to file the Amended 
Complaint, but specifically ruled as follows: 
"2. The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing 
under either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or 
any other theory of law or equity, to challenge or 
otherwise bar the effectuation and implementation of that 
certain Settlement Stipulation between the Audrey 
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants and that such 
Settlement Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed 
to Rio by any of the defendants." T.R. p. 1983. 
The order goes on to dismiss as to both the Audrey 
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants the new allegations of 
Rio's Amended Complaint together with the original Complaint as 
to the Audrey Defendants, dismiss all claims by the Audrey 
Defendants against Rio and the Jimco Defendants, and further 
dismiss all of claims by the Jimco Defendants against the 
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Audrey Defendants. The order did not affect the original 
claims between Rio and the Jimco Defendants. T.R. P. 1983. 
Lastly, the order authorized the disbursement of that portion 
of the funds on deposit to which the Audrey Defendants were 
entitled under the Audrey Lease and the Settlement Stipulation 
and further ordered that Rio in the future pay the Audrey 
Defendants their royalties under the Audrey Lease as well as 
that portion of the Jimco Defendants' royalties which were 
assigned under the Settlement Stipulation. T.R. pp. 1983, 1984. 
Rio then sought to further tie up the funds and block 
implementation of the Settlement Stipulation by seeking a stay 
of the Court's order on appeal and asked the Court to treat the 
deposited funds as a supersedeas bond or as security for 
judgment and costs. Under the terms of the Settlement 
Stipulation this alone would have destroyed its effectuation 
and implementation as immediate disbursement of funds was an 
express condition precedent thereto. These motions were denied 
by the Court by written order dated August 30, 1978, but a stay 
of one week was granted to allow Rio to seek extraordinary 
relief from the Supreme Court. 
On August 31, 1978 Rio petitioned the Supreme Court 
for an extraordinary writ in the nature of mandamus to force 
the trial court to stay its Order regarding the Settlement 
Stipulation, and also moved the Supreme Court for a stay of the 
order and for approval of a supersedeas bond. Briefs were 
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submitted, and following oral argument in which Rio raised all 
of the points it now raises on appeal, the Supreme Court by 
orders dated September 5, 1978 denied Rio's petition and motion. 
Rio now appeals directly from Judge Conder's Order 
dated July 29, 1978 approving the Settlement Stipulation, 
raising its points of objection thereto for the third time. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Rio's "STATEMENT OF FACTS" (Rio's Brief pp. 3-17) 
contains considerable argument as well. Examination of the 
assumptions contained within this argument reveals several 
errors which, when taken as a whole, explain to a substantial 
degree the untenability of the arguments set forth in the 
"ARGUMENT" section of Rio's brief. Whether stated in terms of 
contractual amendment, fiduciary duty or implied covenant, 
Rio's attempts to destroy the settlement by creating duties in 
the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants are all premised 
upon the assumption that because Rio was a party to two 
different contracts, Rio can bind the two different other 
parties to obligations which neither contractor on its face 
could conceivably contemplate. This is because, Rio argues, 
although neither contract viewed separately can reach such a 
result, when put together, by the exercise of certain options, 
the result is adverse to Rio's financial interest. 
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By the very nature of the contractual relationship 
which Rio, one of the world's great mining empires, entered 
into voluntarily, it was theoretically possible that if the 
fair market price of raw ore suddenly soared, and Rio had 
contractually bound itself to sell all of its concentrate for a 
fixed price which did not allow for such an incredible fair 
market value increase, it could find itself to have made a very 
bad bargain. This is indeed what happened in the uranium 
market. Fortunately for the Audrey Defendants, they had 
reserved the right to compute their royalty on either the 
actual sales price, or if this did not reflect market value, at 
the actual fair market value of crude ore, if they so chose. 
The Audrey Defendants so chose, thereby causing 
financial pain to both Rio and the Jimco Defendants. The Jimco 
Defendants, arguably facing possible extinction of any royalty 
payment if the fair market value continued to escalate, chose 
to settle its differences with the Audrey Defendants. Rio, 
while under the settlement still receiving every penny to which 
it is contractually entitled, now plays dog in the manger. 
Additionally, it should be noted that all of Rio's 
stated points of objection to the Settlement Stipulation go to 
the Audrey Defendants waiver therein, for the year 1979 and 
thereafter, of their right to elect under paragraph 3.2 of the 
Audrey Lease. 
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A. 
RIO IS EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM ANY RIGHTS 
UNDER THE ELECTION PROVISIONS OF 
PARAGRAPH 3.2 OF THE AUDREY LEASE 
Rio begins its "factual" recitation with the Audrey 
Lease's Earned Royalty provisions and sets forth the basic 
royalty formula applicable when u3o8 is beneficiated and 
sold i.e., 4% of the sales price per pound of u3o8 • Then 
Rio goes on to describe the election under paragraph 3.2 as 
follows: 
"In addition, the Audreys and Rio expressly reserved 
the right in the Amended Audrey Lease to have those 
royalties based on eight percent of the fair market value 
of crude ore produced from the claims, in lieu of the four 
percent royalty just described." (Rio's brief p. 4) 
The assertion that the election was reserved by both 
the Audrey Defendants and Rio is directly contrary to the 
express language and intent of the parties as Rio is expressly 
excluded from such election by paragraph 21.3. This fact is 
admitted by Rio in the two sentences immediately following: 
"The decision to elect either the eight percent ore or 
the four percent yellowcake royalty is vested exclusively 
in the Audreys under the Amended Audrey Lease, and Rio is 
not entitled to participate in that decision." (R. 80, 
118). 
"Rio gave up the right to participate in making the 
royalty election decision after negotiations between all 
three parties." (Emphasis added.) (Rio's brief pp. 4, 5). 
Rio then refers to the aforementioned conflict of 
interest as the reason for the exclusion. (Rio's brief p. 5). 
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Given the express language of paragraph 21.3 
("Rio ••• shall. .• be excluded from any vote or decision of the 
lessors relating to royalties ..• "), and the admissions by Rio 
that it "gave up the right to participate in making the royalty 
election," it is difficult to imagine how Rio could argue that 
it reserved the election. However, Rio continues by asserting 
an even more astounding contention, i.e., that it "delegated 
the election decision to the Audreys." (Emphasis added). 
(Rio's brief p. 5). A "delegation" is something quite 
different from an "exclusion," and is certainly not synonymous 
with the "giving up" of a right. Rio cannot by such 
characterizations controvert the express provisions of the 
Audrey Lease, nor can it create legal obligations merely by 
wish. The simple fact is that Rio did not reserve the 
election, but rather was expressly excluded therefrom. Given 
this exclusion, Rio has no rights which can be subject to 
delegation. Here lies the fatal defect in Rio's first 
underlying assumption. 
B. 
RIO CANNOT CREATE OBLIGATIONS IN THE 
AUDREY DEFENDANTS FROM THE JIMCO AGREEMENT 
Next, Rio proceeds to attempt to create obligations in 
the Audrey Defendants out of the Jimco Agreement -- a document 
to which the Audrey Defendants ~ not parties. This is 
attempted by setting forth the cumulative impact of both 
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agreements upon Rio's net cash flow as if all such impact 
devolved entirely from the Audrey Lease. 
In examining this attempt it is important to keep in 
mind that under the Audrey Lease the interests of the Audrey 
Defendants and Rio with regard to the payment and receipt of 
royalties are necessarily adverse. Rio as Lessee pays all of 
the Earned Royalties and receives back as co-Lessor only 
one-fourth of the total Lessors royalty. Consequently, under 
the provisions of the Audrey Lease, it is in Rio's best 
interest to reduce the royalties, whereas it is in the Audrey 
Defendant's best interest to increase the royalties. Only 
after the royalty provisions of the Jimco Agreement are plugged 
into the overall royalty scheme do the interests of Rio and the 
Audrey Defendants become compatible since the Jimco Agreement 
limits the total amount of royalties payable by Rio. An 
increase in the amount of royalties receivable by the Lessors 
(including Rio and the Audrey Defendants) under the Audrey 
Lease does not increase Rio's total obligation to pay royalties 
under the Jimco Agreement, but merely cuts into the Jimco 
Defendants' share. Hence, an election by the Audrey Defendants 
which would increase the amount of their royalty and the amount 
of the Lessor-Rio's royalty, by reason of the royalty 
limitations of the Jimco Agreement, would not increase Lessee 
Rio's obligation to pay royalties. The increase is merely 
deducted from the residue payable to the Jimco Defendants. 
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That is not to say, however, that the Audrey Defendants have 
any obligations to Rio arising out of the Jimco Agreement. Rio 
attempts to create such an obligation thus: 
"[Rio] certainly expected that the Audreys would make 
the election from time to time so as to choose the election 
which would pay them [apparently referring to the Audrey 
Defendants) the most money. That decision would of course 
also benefit Rio since it was entitled to one-fourth of the 
total royalties under either election. As one permissible 
royalty formula became more lucrative than the other 
because of changing market conditions for ore or 
yellowcake, all the parties doubtless anticipated that the 
Audreys would choose the more profitable of the two 
elections." (Rio's brief p. 5). 
The Audrey Defendants' obligations regarding the 
election, if any, must come from the Audrey Lease. Said lease 
expressly relieves the Audrey Defendants of any obligation to 
Rio by expressly excluding Rio from participating in the 
election. This is so regardless of any "expectation" on Rio's 
part arising out of the Jimco Agreement. Here lies the fatal 
defect in Rio's second underlying assumption. 
c. 
RIO DOES NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO SHARE ON A PRO RATA 
BASIS IN AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY THE AUDREY 
DEFENDANTS EXCEPT AS TO THOSE ROYALTIES 
PAID PURSUANT TO THE AUDREY LEASE 
The third basic error by Rio is its insistence that it 
is always and under any circumstances entitled to one-fourth of 
whatever amounts the Audrey Defendants receive. This is of 
course true with regard to royalty payments paid pursuant to 
the Audrey Lease since Rio is a one-fourth undivided interest 
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holder with the Audrey Defendants. However, it does not follow 
that Rio is entitled to one-fourth of whatever the Audrey 
Defendants may receive from other agreements to which Rio is 
not a party and for which Rio has given no consideration, i.e., 
the Settlement Stipulation. Here lies the fatal defect in 
Rio's third underlying assumption. 
Having thus examined the fallacies of the assumptions 
which Rio treats as absolutes (or at least argues as if they 
are absolute) and upon which Rio's arguments on appeal are 
premised, examination of Rio's specific points of argument 
becomes easier and more clearly reveals their untenability. 
II 
THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION DOES NOT AMEND OR OTHERWISE 
VARY THE TERMS OF EITHER THE AUDREY LEASE OR THE JIMCO 
AGREEMENT BUT RATHER IS A TOTALLY EXTRANEOUS AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN DEFENDANTS. 
Rio argues that the Settlement Stipulation constitutes 
an amendment to the terms of the Audrey Lease and the Jimco 
Agreement and, therefore, cannot stand without the express 
concurrence of Rio. However, in so arguing, Rio misperceives 
both the stated intent and the actual impact of the 
stipulation. The stipulation leaves intact and operative each 
and every provision of both agreements except for the election 
under paragraph 3.2 to which Rio can claim no right. (See 
discussion supra.) Additionally, the stipulation expressly 
avoids determination of any issue raised in this litigation 
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regarding the construction, interpretation or operation of 
either agreement stating that the defendants agree to settle 
the dispute as between themselves "without admission or 
determination of what is or has been the fair market value of 
crude ore, or whether there is or has been a market value for 
crude ore, or any other issue in this litigation." T.R. p. 
2242. 
The Settlement Stipulation quite simply constitutes a 
determination by the defendants that the relative risks of 
their respective positions in this litigation justify an 
amicable adjustment of their respective shares of the total 
royalty pie. This adjustment is accomplished by the assignment 
by the Jimco Defendants of a portion of the royalties (2.5% of 
the sales price of u3o8) to which they are unquestionably 
entitled under the terms of the Jimco Agreement. 
The adjustment and assignment are totally extraneous 
to both the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement and in no way 
effect either the language of these documents or Rio's rights 
thereunder. Rio argues, however, that the stipulation modifies 
the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement in two ways. First, 
"a permanent waiver of the ore election" under paragraph 3 · 2. 
Second," a permanent reduction in Rio's .12fQ rata share of 
royalties from the subject claims." (Emphasis added) (Rio's 
brief p. 18). 
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As to the first alleged "modification," Rio again 
argues that it has some vested right in the election even 
though it is expressly excluded therefrom, and even though Rio 
admits that it "gave up the right to participate in making the 
royalty election decision." (See Rio brief p. 5 and discussion 
supra.) Clearly, the legitimate exercise by the only parties 
with the sole and exclusive right to elect does not constitute 
an amendment of the Audrey Lease. Rio cannot contend that the 
Audrey Defendants do not have the absolute right to elect to 
have royalties paid on the basis of 4% of the sale price of 
u3o8 in any given year. Such an election would remain, 
under the express terms of paragraph 3.2, effective for each 
year thereafter unless and until expressly revoked by the 
Audrey Defendants. The permanent waiver by the Audrey 
Defendants of this right to elect and revoke is no different in 
effect than such an election without subsequent revocation and 
is no more a modification of the Audrey Lease or an invasion of 
a duty to Rio than such election would be. 
As to the second "modification," Rio can point to no 
agreement, written or oral, which guarantees to Rio a fixed pro 
rata percentage of the payments that the Audrey Defendants 
receive from the subject properties. Rio is guaranteed a 25% 
share of the Earned Royalties paid under the Audrey Lease. 
This guarantee is not altered by the Settlement Stipulation. 
Rio will continue to receive this one-quarter royalty 
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interest. What Rio wants is 25% of what the Audrey Defendants 
receive from ~ other agreement relating to the subject 
properties as well. 
The Audrey Defendants settled its claims in this 
litigation with the Jimco Defendants in exchange for an 
assignment of a portion of the Jimco Defendants' royalties. 
Rio is free to negotiate such a settlement itself if it so 
chooses. However, Rio is no more entitled to share in the 
benefits of the Audrey Defendants' settlement than the Audrey 
Defendants would be entitled to share in any benefits of a Rio 
settlement bargain. 
In short, the Settlement Stipulation does not modify 
or otherwise amend either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco 
Agreement. If the Jimco Defendants had elected to assign a 
portion of its royalties to some other third party, Rio would 
certainly not contend that such an assignment constituted an 
amendment of the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement. The fact 
that the assignee under the Settlement Stipulation happens to 
be the Audrey Defendants does not and cannot alter this right 
of assignment. 
III 
RIO IS NOT AN INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF PARAGRAPH 3.2 
OF THE AUDREY LEASE AND THEREFORE CANNOT CLAIM RIGHTS 
THEREUNDER. 
Rio opens its agrument on its Point II as follows: 
-27-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Rio is not only a party to but an intended 
beneficiary of the Amended Audrey Lease." (Rio's brief p. 
22). 
As stated, this point is so obvious that it overtly 
and overwhelmingly defies argument of course it is generally 
intended that Rio, in its capacity of Lessor, benefit by the 
Audrey Lease's terms! However, Rio proceeds to attempt to 
weave the protective shell of this broad statement around the 
election provisions of paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease -- the 
benefits of which are expressly withheld from Rio. 
An intended beneficiary in terms of the law of third 
party beneficiaries is a third person not a party to a contract 
who was intended by the contracting parties to benefit by their 
bargain. See e.g., Mason v. Tooele City, 26 U.2d 6, 484 P.2d 
153 (1971); Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah 560, 83 P.2d 731 (1938); 
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co. of New York, 60 
Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922); Montogomery v. Spencer, 15 Utah 
495, 50 P. 623 (1897). As stated previously, paragraph 3.2 
expressly excludes Rio. Consequently, it is impossible to 
infer that any party to the Audrey Lease intended that Rio 
benefit from the provisions of paragraph 3.2. Again as 
previously noted, under the terms of the Audrey Lease the 
impact upon Rio of any election by the Audrey Defendants is 
directly converse to the impact upon the Audrey Defendants. 
Therefore an election which benefits the Audrey Defendants 
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burdens Rio, and vice versa. Their interests are, by the 
nature of their relationship, largely hostile and adverse. 
Given the express language excluding Rio from the 
election, together with the adverse practical impact of an 
election by the Audrey Defendants, it is impossible for Rio to 
assume the posture of a third party beneficiary of paragraph 
3.2. 
IV 
THE AUDREY DEFENDANTS HAVE NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
RIO WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 3. 2 AND THEREFORE 
COULD NOT HAVE BREACHED SUCH A DUTY. 
Rio argues that, based upon the fact that Rio and the 
Audrey Defendants are co-tenants to the subject property, the 
Audrey Defendants have a fiduciary duty to exercise the 
election under paragraph 3.2 in a manner benefiting themselves 
and Rio. 
Under certain factual situations, a fiduciary 
relationship exists between tenants in common,~ e.g., 
Webster v. Knop, 6, U.2d 273, 312 P.2d 557 (1957); Heiselt v. 
Heiselt, 10 U.2d 126, 349 P.2d 175 (1960). By the very facts 
set forth in those cases it is clear that such a relationship 
does not exist between the Audrey Defendants and Rio with 
regard to the election under paragraph 3.2. This is so because 
under the concept of a fiduciary relationship it is presupposed 
that the actions of either co-tenant can possibly benefit both 
co-tenants. Such a possibility does not exist in the 
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relationship between the Audrey Defendants and Rio with regard 
to the 3.2 election under the Audrey Lease. 
To fully understand the nature of the relationship 
between the Audrey Defendants and Rio so far as that 
relationship is pertinent to this point, we again must restrict 
our examination to the only source of this relationship, i.e., 
the Audrey Lease. Under the terms of the Audrey Lease it is 
recognized that Rio has a one-fourth (1/4) undivided interest 
in the subject properties, together with a one-fourth (1/4) 
undivided interest in the Earned Royalties paid pursuant to 
such lease. However, unlike most tenancies in common, the 
Audrey Lease also recognizes that Rio is to become (in 
actuality had already become) the Lessee of the subject 
properties and therefore responsible for the payment of 
royalties under the terms of the Lease. Consequently, under 
the terms of the Audrey Lease, for every four dollars paid by 
Rio in royalties, Rio would receive one dollar back, for a net 
loss of three dollars. This four to one ratio in royalty cash 
flow would remain constant regardless of the level of royalty 
payments. 
Turning now to the Audrey Defendants' right to elect 
under paragraph 3.2, since Rio's interest in such election is 
directly converse to that of the Audrey Defendants, it is 
obvious why Rio was precluded from participating in such 
election. Referring back to the four to one cash flow of 
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royalty payments outlined in the preceeding paragraph, if it is 
determined by the Audrey Defendants that royalties based upon 
8% of crude ore values would exceed those based upon 4% of 
yellowcake proceeds, and an election to take based upon crude 
ore is made, such an election would necessarily benefit the 
Audrey Defendants to the detriment of Rio. In other words, the 
net effect to Rio would be an increase in the dollar amount of 
the net loss. Conversely, if it is determined that royalties 
based upon proceeds of yellowcake would be greater and the 
election were revoked, again such revocation would have the 
effect of a net dollar gain to the Audrey Defendants and a net 
dollar loss to Rio. Only if the Audrey Defendants make an 
ill-advised election to their detriment could Rio be 
benefited. Given this direct conflict in the interests of the 
Audrey Defendants and Rio with regard to 3.2 it is little 
wonder that Rio is excluded from participating in the 
election. Also, because of this conflict of interest regarding 
the election between co-tenants, the cases cited by Rio, 
Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (lOth Cir. 1963) and Hendrickson 
v. California Tale Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 279, 130 P.2d 806 
(1943), are inapplicable as both of these cases involved 
actions of mutual benefit. 
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v 
THE AUDREY DEFENDANTS ARE UNDER NO IMPLIED COVENANT 
TO RIO REGARDING THE ELECTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 3.2 
OF THE AUDREY LEASE. 
The last of the many legal and/or equitable theories 
which Rio uses in an attempt to create some duty in the Audrey 
Defendants regarding the election under paragraph 3.2 is the 
theory of implied covenant. Rio makes the following assertion: 
"In this case, the amended Audrey Lease contains an 
implied covenant that the Audreys will make the election 
determination in "furtherance of the interests of" all 
lessors, including Rio. The Audreys' waiver of their right 
to exercise the election in exchange for an additional 
yellowcake proceeds royalty in which Rio does not 
participate breaches that implied covenant." 
(Rio's brief p. 27). 
It is the most fundamental of legal propositions that 
in the interpretation of contracts implied covenants can arise 
and will prevail only when there is no expres provision on the 
subject matter of the implied covenant, and that an express 
agreement or covenant excludes the possibility of an implied 
one of a different or contradictory nature. See, e.g. Hartman 
Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73P.2d 
1163(1937); Jones v. Interstate Oil Corp., 115 Cal. App.2d 302, 
1P.2d 1051 (1931); Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 437 (lOth 
Cir. 1936); 20 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions, Etc. §12 
(1965). 21 C.J.S. Covenants §32 (1940). The subject matter of 
the election under paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and the 
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identification of parties having or not having rights 
thereunder, is expressly dealt with by paragraph 21.3: 
"21. 3 Rio Algom Corporation shall, •.. be excluded from 
any vote.o~ decisi~n.of the Lessors-relating to royalties 
and requ1r1ng unan1m1ty of the Lessors, as provided for in 
Section 3.2 hereof. The unanimous vote or decision of the 
remaining Lessors other than Rio Algom Corporation shall 
constitute unanimity for the purpose of the said Section 
3.2." T.R. p. 118. 
Rio is expressly deprived of and excluded from any 
rights under paragraph 3.2. There can be no implied covenants 
giving Rio rights thereunder as such an implied right would be 
directly contradictory to the expressed intent of the parties. 
The Audrey Defendants are given the exclusive right of 
election under paragraph 3.2 and have, by the terms of the 
Settlement Stipulation, exercised such exclusive right. To 
give Rio the "implied right" to exercise a veto power over such 
election is tantamount to giving Rio a vote or voice in the 
election decision itself. This would be directly contradictory 
to the above-quoted language of paragraph 21.3. Certainly the 
court cannot do such violence to the written expression of the 
intent of the parties! 
VI 
GIVEN THE COURT'S RULING REGARDING THE SETTLEMENT STIPULATION 
DISMISSAL OF RIO'S AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS NOT ONLY 
APPROPRIATE BUT MANDATORY. 
At the time the Settlement Stipulation was executed 
the Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants were aware that 
Rio objected to its terms. Consequently, the stipulation was 
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expressly made subject to a condition precedent of the Court's 
ruling that the stipulation did not violate any duty owed to 
Rio by either signatory. Incorporated into the Settlement 
Stipulation was the following Motion: 
"The Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants hereby 
move the Court for a ruling that Rio has no standing under 
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any 
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise 
bar the effectuation and implementation of the foregoing 
settlement stipulation, that such settlement is not in 
violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants, 
that upon effectuation and implementation of said 
settlement stipulation the Audrey Defendants are 
effectively and totally dismissed from this litigation, and 
that those funds presently on deposit with the court equal 
to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio 
since January 1, 1976, together with accrued interest 
thereon, less any amounts previously withdrawn by the 
Audrey Defendants therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey 
Defendants." 
(T.R. p. 2246). 
In response to this motion, Rio filed a brief 
objecting to the settlement and raising the same points that it 
now raises on appeal. (T. R. pp. 2070-2094) • 
In addition and as a clear attempt to scuttle the 
settlement, Rio moved for leave to amend its complaint to state 
new claims against the defendants purportedly arising out of 
the stipulation itself, i.e., breach of fiduciary duty, breach 
of implied covenant of good faith, self-dealing and 
interference with contract. (T. R. pp. 2090-2110) • 
The collective effect of these motions was to present 
to the court the issue of whether, under any theory of law or 
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equity, there is any duty owed to Rio by either the Audrey 
Defendants or the Jimco Defendants which was breached or 
otherwise violated by the terms of operation of the Settlement 
Stipulation. Determination by the Court of this issue would 
have the duel effect of (1) determining the validity and 
effectiveness of the Settlement Stipulation since the 
aforestated issue was a condition precedent to the stipulation, 
and (2) determining whether the new claims raised by Rio in its 
Amended Complaint stated a claim for relief upon which relief 
could be granted. 
If the question was decided in the affirmative, i.e., 
a duty was owed and violated, the stipulation would dissolve 
under its own terms, and therefore, the new claims by Rio would 
be baseless. If the question was decided in the negative, 
i.e., no duty owed or violated, the stipulation would stand and 
the new claims would fail to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. In either case the new claims of the Amended 
Complaint would be dismissed. 
After having read the briefs submitted by all parties 
(Rio submitted two such briefs), and having heard oral 
argument, the lower Court entered the following ruling: 
"The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing under 
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or an~ 
other theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherw~se 
bar the effectuation and implementation of that certa1n 
Settlement Stipulation between the Audrey Defendants a~d 
the Jimco Defendants and that such Settlement St1pulat1on 
is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the 
defendants." (T.R. p. 1983). 
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Having thus ruled, as a matter of law, the new claims 
raised by Rio's Amended Complaint, which were premised upon the 
existence of one or more such duties, failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted and, therefore, necessarily 
must have been dismissed. 
Of course, it is from this ruling of the lower court 
that Rio now appearls raising the same assertions raised 
below. Again, if this Court finds that there is a duty owed 
them the Settlement Stipulation is void and the parties are 
again enmeshed in litigation, and the new claims will, 
therefore, be baseless. However, if this Court upholds the 
ruling of the trial court, thereby allowing the defendants to 
settle their differences, the new claims would fail to state a 
claim and the trial courts' dismissal of the new claims would 
have to be affirmed. Under no circumstances could the new 
claims of the Amended Complaint be allowed to stand. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue presented to the Court is very simple. Rio 
brought this lawsuit in the nature of an interpleader as 
stakeholder of certain royalties over which the Audrey 
Defendants and the Jimco Defendants had a legitimate dispute. 
In furtherance of the general judicial policy in favor of 
settlement of litigation and, at least as to the Audrey 
Defendants, in order to receive the funds upon which their 
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livelihoods depend, the defendants have agreed as to how their 
shares of the royalties will be divided as between themselves. 
This has been accomplished without violation of any right of or 
duty to Rio. Rio is left completely free to negotiate or 
litigate with the Jimco Defendants the royalty value of its 
one-quarter Lessors interest. But certainly Rio should not be 
allowed, and indeed does not have the right, to act as a dog in 
the manger to block a legitimate settlement of the very dispute 
which Rio asked the lower court to resolve in the first place! 
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of April, 1979. 
WILLIAM G. WALDECK 
P. 0. Box 2188 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Bank Building 
Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Audrey Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of April, 1979, 
I personally delivered a copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
James B. Lee, Esq. 
Kent Winterholler, Esq. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Clinton D. Vernon, Esq. 
415 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Clifford L. Ashton, Esq. 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 
141 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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(' 
WILLIAM G. WALDECK 
P. 0. Box 2188 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81501 
Telephone: (303) 242-4614 
and 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Defendants, 
Audrey White, N. J. White, 
Wilma White, Otis Dibler, 
Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace 
Davis and Marlowe C. Smith 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
By E. SCOTT SAVAGE 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON 
Attorneys for 
Jimco Defendants 
141 East 1st South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, 
JUANITA J. MEYER AS EXECUTRIX 
OF THE ESTATE OF DANIEL H. 
MEYER, ELDON J. CARD, NORMA 
HUDSON, JEAN L. CARD, JUANITA 
J. MEYER, N.J. WHITE, AUDREY 
WHITE, WILMA WHITE, OTIS 
DIBLER, DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, 
GRACE DAVIS, and MARLOWE C. 
SMITH, 
Defendants. 
SETTLEMENT STIPULATION AND MOTION 
Civil No. 234808 
The defendants, by and through their counsel of record, 
submit to the Court the following stipulation and motion in an 
attempt to settle this dispute, at least as between themselves: 
STIPULATION 
In an effort to resolve this dispute, and in furtherance 
of the public policy to settle litigation when possible, and 
2241 
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without admission or determination of what is or has been the 
fair market value of crude ore, or whether there is or has been 
a market value for crude ore, or any other issue in this liti-
gation, defendants Audrey White, N. J. White. Wilma White, Otis 
Dibler, Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, Marlowe C. Smith and 
Adrian Smith (hereinafter ''Audrey Defendants'') and defendants 
Jimco, Ltd., Humeca Exploration Company, Jim L. Hudson, Daniel 
H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card, Norma Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer and Jean 
L. Card (hereinafter "Jimco Defendants") hereby stipulate to the 
following settlement of the pending dispute as between them-
selves, subject only to the condition precedent hereinafter set 
forth: 
1. The Audrey Defendants agree to take in full satis-
faction of all royalty obligations owed to them by both the 
Jimco Defendants and Rio Algom Corporation (hereinafter "Rio") 
under both the Audrey Lease and the Jimco Agreement, 5.5$ oft~ 
total proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio to Duke Power 
Company or any other purchaser. 
a. With regard to the funds deposited into Court by 
Rio, the Audrey Defendants are entitled to, and there should be 
immediately released by the court, an amount equal to 5.5% of 
the proceeds of the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 
1976, together with earned interest thereon, less any amounts 
previously withdrawn from such funds. The Audrey Defendants 
shall also be entitled to 5.5$ of any retroactive increases in 
the per pound price of yellowcake negotiated or received by Rio 
from Duke Power Company or any other purchaser and applicable to 
yellowcake sold since January 1, 1976. 
b. If, in the future, Rio deposits into Court any 
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funds to which, under the provisions of this stipulation, the 
Audrey Defendants are entitled, the Jimco Defendants agree to 
join the Audrey Defendants in moving the court for the release 
of such funds. 
c. For the balance of 1978, and thereafter, the 
! Jimco Defendants agree to assign and transfer to the Audrey 
:I 
'II Defendants and to direct Rio to calculate and pay to the Audrey 
i Defendants, that amount which, when added to that amount which 
I, 
,i the Audrey Defendants would otherwise receive directly from Rio, 
1
' equals 5.5J of the proceeds received by Rio from Duke Power 
Company, or any other purchaser, for the sale of yellowcake. 
2. For the calendar year 1979, and all years there-
after, the Audrey Defendants hereby waive the1r right to the 
election of royalty payments based upon market value of crude 
ore as provided in paragraph 3.2 of the Audrey Lease, and agree 
to timely revoke their previous election under paragraph 3.2. 
Timely notice of the revocation of said election will be pro-
vided by the Audrey Defendants to Rio. 
3. The Jimco Defendants agree to execute any assign-
ments determined by the Audrey Defendants to be necessary to 
effectuate payment of royalties to the Audrey Defendants as set 
ii forth herein. 
4. The Audrey Defendants agree upon effectuation of the 
foregoing to dismiss any and all pending cross-claims against 
the Jimco Defendants, and any and all pending counterclaims 
against Rio. 
5. The Jimco Defendants agree upon effectuation of the 
foregoing to dismiss any and all pending cross-claims as against 
the Audrey Defendants, and only as against them. The Jimco 
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Defendants expressly reserve their claims as against Rio. 
The foregoing stipulation is subject only to the condi-
tion precedent of the Court's ruling, pursuant to the motion 
made herein, that Rio has no right based upon either the Audrey 
Lease or the Jimco A~reement, or based upon any other theory of 
law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation or 
implementation of this settlement stipulation, that such settle-
: ment is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of the 
defendants, and that the effectuation and implementation of this 
settlement stipulation effectively and totally dismisses the 
Audrey Defendants from this litigation, and that those funds 
presently on deposit with the court equal to 5-5~ of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976, 
! together with accrued interest thereon, less any amounts pre-
'viously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants therefrom, be 
,r promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants. 
DATED this 10:!.f day of July, 1978. 
-4-
WILLIAM G. WALDECK 
Attorneys for Audrey Defendants 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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The Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants hereby 
move the Court for a ruling that Rio has no standing under 
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any other 
,, 
1theory of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the 
I 
,! effectuation and implementation of the foregoing settlement 
stipulation, that such settlement is not in violation of any 
duty owed to Rio by any of the defendants, that upon effectua-
tion and implementation of said settlement stipulation the 
Audrey Defendants are effectively and totally dismissed from 
;, this litigation, and that those funds presently on deposit with 
,the court equal to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale of yellow-
::cake by Rio since January 1, 1976, together with accrued inter-
est thereon, less any amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey 
'iDefendants therefrom, be promptly paid to the Audrey Defendants. 
DATED this /Oy day of July, 1978. 
WILLIAM G. WALDECK 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
8y 
Attorneys for Audrey Defendants 
-6-
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
McCARTHY 
Byz_~~ 
E. Scott Savage 
Attorneys for Jimco Defendant 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CLINTON D. VERNON 
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~uG 2'1 !Q 3; ;:i '78 
rr. ~-:;~ · ':..; ,:. • •··< ~~E~K 
BY.~~~~~~-~~~< 
•-'t\ UtrU:'( CLE.=i.:( 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTA-'! 
RIO ALGOM CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JIMCO LTD., HUMECA EXPLORATION 
COMPANY, JIM L. HUDSON, JUANITA 
J. ~!EYER AS EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ESTATE OF DA.~IEL H. MEYER, 
ELDOII J. CARD, NORMA HUDSON, 
JEA.~ L. CARD, JUANITA J. MEYER, 
N. J. WHITE, AUDREY WHITE, 
WI~~ WHITE, OTIS DIBLER, 
DOROTHY MAE DIBLER, GRACE 
DAVIS, and MARLOW C. SMITH. 
Defendants. 
ORDER REGARDING SETTLEMENT 
STIPULATION, DISMISSING CLAIMS 
AND AUTHORIZING DISBURSEMENT 
OF FUNDS 
Civil No. 234808 
This matter came on for hearing before the above entitled 
court on the 16th day of August, 1978 pursuant to the motion of 
defendants Audrey White, N~ J. White, Wilma Wh1te, Otis Dibler, 
Dorothy Mae Dibler, Grace Davis, Marlowe C. Smith and Adrian Smith 
(hereinafter "Audrey Defendants") and defendants Jimco, Ltd., Humeca 
Exploration Company, Jim L. Hudson, Daniel H. Meyer, Eldon J. Card, 
Norma Hudson, Juanita J. Meyer and Jean L. Card (hereinafter "Jimco 
Defendants") regarding the settlement stipulation between them which 
was filed with the court on the lOth day of July, 1978, and pursuant 
to plaintiff Rio Algom Corporation's (hereinafter "Rio") motion to 
amend complaint. Rio was represented by James B. Lee, Gordon L. 
Roberts and Kent w. Winterholler of Parsons, Behle & Latimer; the 
Jimco Defendants were represented by Clifford E. Ashton and E. Scott 
savage of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy and Clinton D. Vernon; 
and the Audrey Defendants were represented by Albert J. Colton and 
Anthony L. Rampton of Fabian & Clendenin. 
The court, having read ~~e briefs submitted by counsel, hav-
ing heard oral arguments by counsel, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
EXHIBIT "8" 
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HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. That Rio is granted leave to file its Amended Complaint. 
2. The court hereby rules that Rio has no standing under 
either the Audrey Lease or the Jimco Agreement, or any other theory 
of law or equity, to challenge or otherwise bar the effectuation and 
implementation of that certain Settlement Stipulation between the 
Audrey Defendants and the Jimco Defendants and that such Settlement 
Stipulation is not in violation of any duty owed to Rio by any of 
the defendants. 
3. That, pursuant to the foregoing ruling and in accordance 
therewith, the First Cause of Action as against the Audrey Defendants 
and the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of Action as against all 
defendants, of Rio's Amended Complaint are hereby dismissed with 
prejudice; further.more, pursuant to the Settlement Stipulation any 
and all pending cross-claims by the Audrey Defendants against the 
Jimco Defendants and by the Jimco Defendants against the Audrey 
Defendants are hereby dismissed with prejudice; and further pursuant 
to such Settlement Stipulation any and all pending counterclaims 
by the Audrey Defendants against Rio are hereby dismissed with prejud 
4. That the clerk of the court is hereby ordered to immed-
iately disburse and pay over to the Audrey Defendants through their 
attorneys, Fabian & Clendenin, from the funds presently on deposit 
with the court the amount of $921,691.00 (which represents 5.5% of 
the proceeds from the sale of yellowcake by Rio since January 1, 1976 
less any amounts previously withdrawn by the Audrey Defendants, as 
computed on Schedule A attached hereto), together with accrued inter-
est thereon. 
5. That, from the date of this order and as long as Rio 
receives proceeds from the sale of yellowcake from the subject pro-
perties, Rio is hereby ordered to pay when due under the terms of 
the Audrey Lease to the Audrey Defendants at the Moab National Bank 
in Moab, Utah, an amount equal to 5.5% of the proceeds from the sale 
by Rio of such yell~Jcake including any retroactive increases in the i 
-2-
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per pound price of yellowcake negotiated or received by Rio from 
Duke Power Company 
DATED this 
or any other pur~~aser. 
2fl_ day of (d.-<-'-". 
BY TQE 
• 1978. 
COURT: 
District Judge 
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SCHEDULE A 
Computation of 5.5% of yellowcake proceeds dervied from 
supporting information supplied to the court by plaintiff: 
Tender t 
~
Tender iS 
5/2/77 
Tender t6 for 
Sale price 
per pound 
multiplied 
by amount (lbs) 
Sold 
166,615 lbs. 
X 13.78/lb. 
Total 
Sales 5.5% of 
Price Sales Price 
$2,295,954.70 $126,277.60 
6/24/77 recapitulates total sales for the year 1976 as: 
Tender #7 
7/29/77 
Tender #8 
9/23/77 
Tender #9 
10/28/77 
Tender UO 
12/21/77 
Tender ill 
l/30/78 
Tender #12 
3/l/78 
Tender il3 
7/24/78 
639,666 lbs. 
X 13.48/lb. 
(final price) 8,622,697.68 
145,475 lbs. 
X 13.89/lb. 2,020,647.75 
47,303 lbs. 
X 14.04/lb. 664,134.12 
174,847 lbs. 
X 14.14/lb. 2,472,336.58 
Not applicable; this is payment of 
1976 holdback; holdback is not 
applicable to Audrey defendants. 
162,432 lbs. 
X 14.43/lb. 
179,888 lbs. 
X 14.61/lb. 
170,720 lbs. 
X 14.81/lb. 
2,343,893.76 
2,628,163.68 
2,528,363.20 
474,248.37 
111,135.62 
36,527.37 
135,978.50 
128,914.15 
144,548.99 
139,059.97 
$1,296,691.00 
Less amount paid 2/l/78 375,000.00 
921,691.00 
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